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Abstract 
This paper undertakes a comprehensive evaluation of the efficacy of 
firm-specific trading halts in the Malaysian context.  The paper examines 
a total of 291 trading halts that occurred over the five year period 2000 
to 2004.  In addition to examining the three variables commonly 
impacted by trading halts, stock price reaction, volatility of returns and 
trading volume, we also examine four additional parameters that could 
have material impact.  These are (i) the type of halt whether voluntary or 
mandatory, (ii) type of news released, (iii) duration of halt and (iv) 
frequency. 
 
 Based on our overall sample, trading halts result in a positive 
price reaction, increased volume and volatility.  We find evidence of 
information leakage, significant difference between voluntary and 
mandatory halts and the type of news released during halt to have a 
huge impact.  The duration of halt has isolated impact and is largely 
inconsequential.  The frequency of halts does not seem to matter.  While 
these results broadly conform with previous studies  of trading halts in 
other markets, our refined analysis by subcategory showed some 
interesting differences.  The two key differences were the significantly 
positive price reaction for the sample of mandatory halts and the lower 
volatility for voluntary halts.  We attribute the positive price reaction of 
mandatory halts to the peculiarity of regulation and the resulting 
survivor bias.  We argue that the lower volatility for voluntary halts 
particularly for those in the good news category, imply that these stocks 
are being repriced.  With the exception of some subsets, our overall 
results appear to be strongly supportive of The Price Efficiency 
hypothesis of trading halts which argues that trading halts help 
disseminate information and enhance the price discovery process. 
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Introduction 
 
 The efficacy of trading halts (or trading suspensions) in overcoming informational 
asymmetries remains a controversy.  A trading halt being a temporary suspension of trading in 
a stock is essentially a signal by the exchange that a disequilibrium exists or is expected to 
exist.  That disequilibrium may be the result of an order imbalance or more likely,  due to 
pending news.  The halt therefore is a time-out for the adjustment of prices during real or 
perceived temporary disequilibriums.  Though numerous studies have been undertaken in 
various markets, there appears to be no consensus on the usefulness of trading 
halts/suspensions.  The objective of a trading halt, whether a voluntary one, initiated by the 
firm or a mandatory one imposed by regulators, is always to ensure fair access to information 
and price formation.  Whether that objective is indeed achieved is the debate.  Supporters of 
trading halts propose that calling a halt to trading  just prior to the voluntary or forced release of 
critical information enhances price formation/discovery by ensuring equitable dissemination 
and assimilation.  Often denoted the Price Efficiency Hypothesis of trading halts,1  the rationale 
is that, since a trading suspension gives time for investors to better digest the impact of the 
news, price dispersions should be smaller, implying lower volatility, and a higher degree of 
price efficiency on reopening.  Opponents of  trading halts, using “learning through trading 
models”, would argue that since a halt prevents trading during the suspension period, excess 
volatility is not necessarily being avoided merely postponed.  Based on the logic of  learning 
through trading models therefore, reopening prices would be noisy.  This implies reduced 
pricing efficiency and increased volatility. 
 
                                                 
1 See Chen H, Chen H & Valerios, N(2003) 
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 Just as the arguments have been diametric, the empirical evidence have thus far been 
mixed.  Thus, the continuing debate.  Most empirical work on firm-specific trading halts have 
focused on the three key variables most likely to be affected by a halt; excess returns, 
price/returns volatility and trading volume.  While findings of the behaviour of these three 
variables post-halt provides a mixed picture, studies that have refined the analysis have 
produced interesting results.  Indeed, the mixed evidence begs for refinement.  It appears that 
factors driving the halt may be just as important as the halt itself in explaining post halt 
behaviour of the three variables.  Our examination of existing literature point to at least four 
parameters associated with a trading halt that could throw additional light on the evidence.  
First, the reason for the halt/suspension; whether it was voluntary or mandatorily imposed.  
Second, the type of news or information released during the halt, whether it constitutes good, 
bad or neutral news.  Third, the duration of the halt and finally, the fourth parameter would be 
frequency; whether for the stock in question, the halt constitutes a first (single) halt or one of 
several- (multiple) halts.  While early studies had focused on the impact of the halt/suspension 
alone, later studies have brought to bear at least one or more of the above parameters. 
 
1.1: Motivation/Justification 
 
 Trading halts are by definition ‘disruptive’ events, almost always associated with events 
that have the potential to cause abrupt or extreme moves.  While market-wide trading halts are 
indeed rare and unpredictable events2,  firm specific trading halts are not.  Indeed as emerging 
markets have expanded their market capitalization, firm specific halts have been more frequent.  
In Malaysia’s, Bursa Malaysia there have been more than 300 trading suspensions over the last 
                                                 
2 Such as the trading halt on the NYSE following the September 11 attacks. 
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5 years.  Despite the fact that trading halts appear to be a fairly common occurrance, we are 
unaware of any systematic study of the phenomenon in Malaysia.  This absence provides the 
motivation and justification for this study. 
 
 As is the case with other markets, trading halts or temporary suspensions of listed 
stocks in Bursa Malaysia may be on a voluntary basis or one imposed mandatorily.  The 
administrative framework for such temporary suspensions are outlined in Chapter 16 of Bursa 
Malaysia’s Listing Guidelines.  While voluntary suspensions are initiated by a listed issuer 
through a request to the exchange, it  remains the Exchange’s discretion to grant such a 
suspension.  Mandatory suspensions can be initiated either by the Exchange or the Securities 
Commission (SC).  The SC can notify the exchange to suspend a stock from trading if it deems 
that the issuer has breached or failed to comply with the Securities Industry Act 1983, the 
Securities Commission Act 1993 or  when the Commission feels that “it is necessary or 
expedient in the public interest or where necessary for the protection of investors”.   Section 
16.02 of the Listing Guideline provides the Exchange the right to suspend at any time the 
trading of any listed security if the issuing Company is undergoing a substantial corporate 
exercise, capital restructuring, a stock conversion or exercise in the event of any breach of  the 
listing requirements.  Additionally; the exchange may also mandatorily suspend trading of a 
stock if in its opinion, “it is necessary or expedient in the interest of maintaining an orderly 
and fair market in securities traded on the Exchange”,  As is evident, both voluntary and 
mandatory suspensions can be the result of a wide range of reasons.  While authorities 
obviously have broad powers to halt trading, companies too can request voluntary suspension 
of their stock for any number of reasons. 
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 In this paper we examine a total of 291 firm-specific trading halts that occurred over the 
five year period, 2000 to 2004 on Bursa Malaysia.    The paper is divided into five sections.  
Section 2 below, provides a review of the literature.  Section 3 lays out our research questions, 
describes the data, research design and methodology.  Section 4, presents the results and our 
analysis.  The final section, Section 5, concludes with our evaluation of the efficacy of trading 
halts in the Malaysian context and implications for policy. 
 
Section 2:  Literature Review 
 
 Much of  the research interest in Trading halts appears to have originated from the 
seminal work of Hopewell & Schwartz (1978).  In that study of several hundred firm specific 
halts on the NYSE, they report three key findings.  First, that there is a permanent price 
adjustment in response to the new information released.  Second, that there is anticipatory  
price behaviour consistent with insider trading and information leakage.  Third, post-
suspension price behaviour presents little, if any opportunity for systematic trading profits.  
Additionally, they also report that suspensions of longer duration typically result in price 
adjustments of greater magnitude.  Most other US based studies on trading halts have also 
examined their impact on trading volume and volatility.  At least three such studies document 
significant increase in both volume and volatility post-halt.  Lee, Ready & Seguin (1994), 
compare the impact of trading halts versus ‘pseudohalts’ non halt control periods on volume 
and volatility.  They conclude that trading halts increase rather than reduce both volume and 
volatility.   For the first full day post halt, they find trading volume to be 230% higher and 
volatility, between 50 – 115% higher compared to pseudohalts.  Further, the persistently high 
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volume for days +2 and +3 does not seem to fit the ‘learning through trading model’.  These 
results are consistent with the earlier findings of Ferris, Kumar & Wolfe (1992) who examine 
the impact of mandatory SEC ordered trading halts.  They find volume and volatility to be 
higher than normal in the pre suspension period with the trend continuing in the immediate post 
suspension period.  They also report a permanent devaluation of the stocks during the 
suspension with the extent of the devaluation dependent on the announced reason for the halt.  
Examining trading halts on the NASDAQ, Christie, Corwin & Harris (2002), report 
significantly higher volatility, volume and bid-ask spreads in the period following halts.  
Comparing their results with those based on the NYSE and others, they find trading halts to 
have important effects, independent of market structure and the specific halt mechanism used. 
 
 Yet other US studies, while reporting similar findings with regards to price, volatility 
and volume have examined additional parameters.  Howe & Schlarbaum (1986) in addition to 
arguing that suspensions are almost always ‘bad news’,3    show that there is a correlation 
between the length of suspension (measured in trading days) and cumulative abnormal returns.  
Longer suspensions coincide with bigger negative residuals.  Chen, Chen & Valerios (2003) 
examine intraday data for 1992 of NYSE stocks.  Their findings show that the type and 
significance of news determines the benefit from the trading halt.  They argue that halts can be 
beneficial if the halt was due to the release of some significant news.  But when a halt is called 
pending news release of little significance, the halt actually injects more noise into prices and 
undermines price discovery. 
 
                                                 
3 They found 80% of suspended securities to have suffered substantial devaluation. 
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 A number of papers have examined trading halts in other countries.  Kabir (1994), in 
analyzing stock specific suspensions on the London Stock Exchange, points at anticipatory 
behaviour pre-halt and argues that the presence of significantly positive abnormal returns up to 
a month following reinstatement of trading, implies one of two things.  Either the complete 
impact of new information release takes place gradually or that not all relevant information is 
disclosed during the halt.  The issue of information dissemination during halts is also examined 
by Wu (1998) for the Hong Kong market.  He finds that mandatory suspension show more 
effectiveness in disseminating information than voluntary suspensions.  His findings about 
price reaction, volatility and volume are largely in sync with that of the US studies.  Tan & Yeo 
(2003), study the impact of the type of news on voluntary suspensions in Singapore.  Grouping 
firm initiated suspensions into ‘favourable’ and ‘unfavourable’ news, they find that while the 
first group shows significant positive abnormal returns around the event date, the latter group 
suffers prolonged decline.  They also point out that the much higher post suspension volatility 
of returns implies that the rationale behind voluntary suspensions is to release price sensitive 
info rather than to curb existing volatility. 
 
 At least one study of the Italian market (Borsa Italiana) and another of the Portugese 
market produce results in conformity with findings elsewhere.  That volume and volatility are 
higher post halt.  Generalizing across the studies conducted in different markets, the broad 
conformity of results imply that market microstructures do not matter.  What appears to matter 
is the type of information released, duration of the halt and voluntary or mandatorily imposed. 
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Section 3: Data & Methodology 
 
3.1: Research Frame Work 
 
 As the objective of this study is to examine the overall effectiveness of trading halts in 
ensuring fair and orderly markets, we examine several issues related to the efficacy of halts.  In 
line with the previous work cited in Section 2 above, we begin by examining the variables 
commonly impacted by trading halts, i.e; Stock price reaction, volatility of returns and trading 
volume.  Since the leakage of information has direct impact on the efficacy of halts, we also 
explore for evidence of such leakage.  In addition to these four factors, as the first study on 
trading halts in the Malaysian context, we seek to add to the comprehensiveness of the study by 
including four related dimensions.  These being (i) type of halt; whether voluntary or 
mandatory, (ii) category of news released, whether good, bad or neutral (iii) duration of halt 
and (iv) frequency; whether the halt constitutes a single halt for the stock or is one of several 
(multiple).  As is evident from Section 2, previous studies have included one or more of these 
four dimensions when examining price, volume and volatility.  Results have shown that these 
dimensions could have material effect on the overall effectiveness of trading halts.  Thus, in 
this study we seek to examine each of the four standard variables, price reaction, volatility, 
volume and information leakage within each of the four dimensions.  For example, is the price 
reaction, volatility, volume and extent of information leakage any different for voluntary versus 
mandatory halts, or when the news released is of different type etc.  Given this objective, we 
frame the following 5 broad research questions.   These are (i) what is the overall impact of 
trading halts on stock returns, volatility and volume?  (ii) How different are these results when 
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the halt is voluntary as opposed to mandatory?  (iii) What difference if any, does the type of 
news released make? (iv)   Does the duration of the halt/suspension have any influence? and (v) 
Are the results of single halts any different from those of multiple halts?   
 
 In categorizing the above dimensions, we do the following.  Differentiating between 
voluntary and mandatory halts is straight-forward.  Where a halt was requested by the issuing 
firm, it is the former.  Where the halt was imposed by the either Bursa Malaysia or the SC, it is 
a mandatory halt.   
 
 Unlike Ferris et al (1992) or Tan & Yeo (2003) who use the positive / negative daily 
abnormal returns prior to a halt to classify their sample in the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news category, 
we examine the news released during the halt4.  A judgment is then made on the category of 
news.  Most were fairly straightforward.  Announcements reporting increased earnings, profits, 
higher dividends, the winning of new contracts etc were categorised as ‘good’ news.  The 
opposite would constitute ‘bad’ news.  Where the news was deemed to be neither, for example 
unchanged earnings, etc. or where we were unsure, we classified it in the ‘neutral’ news 
category.  For duration of the halt, we had three classifications.  A halt is classified to be of 
‘short’ if the halt is for one trading day5, medium if the halt has a  duration between 2 to 5 
trading days.  Halts longer than 5 trading days (one week) was  classified  long.  Finally, in 
determining whether a halt belongs to the single or multiple suspension category, we use a one 
year cut-off.  If a stock was suspended more than once within a one year period, we classify it 
in the multiple suspension category. 
                                                 
4 Or news released just after the announcement of the halt. 
5 The shortest duration of halts in Malaysia is one day. 
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 Our dataset consists of 291 trading halts that occurred on the Bursa Malaysia over the 
five year period 2000 to 2004.  Of the 291 total, 263 halts were voluntarily requested by the 
issuing firms whereas 28 were mandatory halts imposed by either Bursa Malaysia or the SC.  
The basis of our analysis is daily closing price data of each sample for a 120 trading day period 
around the announcement date of the halt.  That is 60 days immediately prior to announcement 
date and 60 days following resumption of trading. All daily price data were sourced from 
Bloomberg.  Others such as information on announcements and firm specific information were 
from Bursa Malaysia publications and newspapers. 
 
3.2: Methodology 
 
 In line with almost all previous work in this area, we use an Event-study framework.  
Thus, to examine the price reaction to a trading halt announced, we compute the Abnormal 
Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the two 60 day period windows for 
each firm.   Where necessary, we also examine smaller windows within 60 day windows.  
Daily CAR is computed as; 
∑
=
==
t
t
titi NIiARCAR
1
,, .,.........  ………………………..(1) 
Where the daily abnormal return on day t for stock i is determined as : 
tititi RRAR ,
^
,, −= ……………………………………………….. (2) 
The abnormal return  is the difference of day t’s actual return less the expected 
return  where; 
tiAR , tiR ,
tiR ,
^
 
tiiti RMBR
^^
,
^ += α  ……………………………………………….(3)                                     
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RM being the returns of the KLSE CI (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index).  Beta 
was estimated using daily stock and market returns for the 60 day period; -61 to -120 pre halt 
announcement. 
 
Next, we compute the daily mean abnormal return which is the average abnormal return across 
all samples on day t.  
 
The daily mean abnormal return (MAR) is; 
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In addition to computing daily  for each of our sample companies, we  compute mean 
overall  for all sample companies for each window period.  The Mean Cummulative 
Abnormal Return (MCAR) is determined as: 
sCAR
sCAR
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 In determining daily returns volatility for each window period, we first determine the 
volatility of returns across all sample firms by day (t).  This is computed as: 
 ( )[ ] 100Re 1,1,,, xCPCPCP titititi −−−=τ  
Where ti,Re τ  is % return for firm  i, on day t.  is the closing price for stock of firm i on 
day t.  
tiCP ,
( )
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2
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==  ……………………………….. (7) 
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For trading volume, we use the absolute number of stocks traded for each sample firm on day t. 
 NtvTV
N
ti
tit ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
=
,  ………………………………………………..(8)  
Where  is mean trading volume across all sample firms on day t.   is trading volume of 
stock for firm i on day t. 
tTV titv ,
 
While CARs and Abnormal returns are used to determine the impact of trading halts on price 
behaviour, we examine the impact on returns volatility and trading volume by two means.  
First, the standard means test using the t-statistics and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed 
rank test.  The latter test assumes the distribution is unknown or non-normal.  Additionally, the 
Wilcoxon test uses the median to avoid test misspecifications that may arise from asymmetry in 
cross-sectional tabulations and non normal distribution.  In comparing volatility pre and post-
halt, we compare variance between sample using the F-test instead of t-test.   Previous studies 
have shown that results drawn from event study can be sensitive to sample size and estimation 
period6.  To avoid the bias that may arise from selection of a pre and post event period, we 
examine the results by varying the window periods and by dividing the sample into the 4 
additional dimensions mentioned above – categorization by type of halt, type of news, duration 
etc. 
 
3.3: Testable Hypotheses 
 A number of testable hypotheses about the impact of halts on price, volatility and 
volume may be inferred from previous literature. 
                                                 
6 Coutts, Mills & Roberts (1994), cited in Wu (1998) 
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(i) Price Effect; a trading halt can either enhance price discovery by providing participants 
 a “time-out” to assimilate impending new information as its proponents argue or 
 interfere with price discovery as its opponents point out.   Either way, more important 
 than the halt is the information released during the  halt. A company calls for a 
 voluntary trading halt of its shares in order to release new information.  In the case 
 of a mandatorily required halt, even if no information is forthcoming immediately 
 following the halt, the mere fact that  authorities had stopped trading in the stock is a 
 signal that there is a substantive problem.  Thus, in the absence of  information leakage, 
 the impact of trading halts on price behaviour would be in one of the following two 
 forms; 
 
i. If information released is insignificant, there should be no abnormal returns on 
trading resumption. 
ii. If the information released is significant, a price reaction should occur. The kind of 
reaction being dependent on the type of news. 
Additionally; 
iii. If the market had anticipated the information released during the halt, then we 
should expect ‘price continuation’; i.e. prices continue to move in the same 
direction.  On the other hand, if the news released was unanticipated, then a price 
reversal could be the case. 
Thus, with these three hypotheses, we test (i) whether trading halts are significant 
events where price behaviour is concerned (ii) whether post halt price behaviour is 
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dependent on the type of news and (iii) whether information released during halts 
merely reinforce anticipations or otherwise. 
 
(ii) Effect on Returns Volatility; if trading halts indeed provide evaluate a time-out for 
participants to properly evaluate information during real or perceived market 
disequilibrium, then, one should expect lower returns volatility post-halt.  Alternatively 
going by the logic of learning thru trading models, the absence of transactions should 
exacerbate the uncertainty/disequilibrium thereby causing an increase in returns 
volatility post halt. 
 
(iii) Effect on Trading Volume; there are two reasons why halts can be expected to have an 
impact on traded volume.  First, the release of new information may require market 
participants to adjust their positions/exposure in the stock.  Volume increases post halt 
as the stock changes hands.  Second, if one assumes trading in normal times to be 
evenly distributed over time, then it can be expected that when trading resumes 
following a halt, volume ought to be higher in order to compensate for the disruption.  
This also implies that the longer the trading halt, the greater the impact would be on 
volume. 
 
Section 4:  Results and Analysis 
 Given the numerous permutations involved in our analysis, for ease of elucidation we 
present our results by the four variables of interest, Price, Returns Volatility, Volume and 
Information Leakage.  Following an overall examination of the impact of trading halts on each 
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of these variables, we then present the results of our analysis examining each variable by the 
four dimensions, type of halt, type of news released, duration of halt and frequency;  whether a 
single or multiple halt.  The breakdown of sample size within each of these subcategories is 
shown in Table 6. 
 
4.1: Effect on Price 
 Table 1 and Figure 1 show the results of our analysis of daily Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) for the 120 day  period surrounding the halt announcement.  Table 1 shows the 
Mean CARs (MCARs) for 3 pairs of Window periods, 60 days pre/post; 30 days pre/post and 5 
days pre/post announcement.  The results of the paired samples t-test and the non parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test for difference in means and the probability levels are also shown. 
 
 Overall, for the full sample of 291 firm-specific halts, MCARs are higher for all 3 
windows in the post-halt period.  In other words, there is positive price reaction once a halt is 
lifted.  There is a big jump in MCAR for the +5 day window.  This is followed by a steady rise 
in the two subsequent window periods +30 and +60.  Thus, prices are much higher 60 days 
after the resumption of trading relative, to where they were 60 days before the announcement of 
halt.  Both statistical tests (t and Wilcoxon) show post halt MCARs to be significantly higher 
relative to their pre-halt windows at the 5% level.  Interestingly, when observing the MCARs 
for the 3 pre halt periods, we see a steady increase as we approach announcement date.  Pre-
halt MCAR is at it’s maximum for the -5 day window.  This steady buildup in prices is also 
clearly evident in Figure 1 which plots daily CARs.  
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4.2: Price Effect by Type of Halt 
 The subsequent two columns show the results when the overall sample is separated into 
Voluntary and Mandatory halts.  Recall that our sample constituted 263 voluntary and 28 
mandatory halts.  Looking at the results for the voluntary halts, we see results very similar to 
the overall.  All 3 post halt MCARs are higher and significantly so for the 60 and 30 day 
windows.  We also see the marked increase in MCAR just prior to announcement.  The MCAR 
for the -5 day window is more than 5 times larger than that of the -60 day window.  That the 
results for voluntary halts are very similar to that of the overall sample should not be surprising 
given that the large majority (almost 90%) of our sample constitute  voluntary halts. 
 
 Analysis of mandatory halts produced some very interesting results.  A first glance at 
Figure 1, shows two things.  First, relative to voluntary halts, daily CARs in the post halt period 
is much higher.  Second, they are also much more volatile in both the pre and post halt period 
relative to the voluntary sample.  Going by MCAR numbers in Table 1, with the exception of 
the -5 day window, all MCARs are higher for mandatory halts relative to voluntary ones.  
Paired tests comparing the means across the two samples, shown in Table 2, confirms this.  Not 
only are MCARs higher after the halt, but are higher by several fold relative to pre-halt 
windows.  Daily CARs exceed 30% as at day +60 (Figure 1).  These results are contrary to 
expectations.  Mandatory halts, being suspensions imposed by authorities are a negative signal.  
It implies a breach/wrong doing or some other inadequacy on the part of the issuing firm.  From 
this viewpoint, the huge positive CARs post halt are indeed a contradiction.  However, when 
we consider the regulatory structure of mandatory halts and the survivor bias of our sample, the 
results are logical. 
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 Malaysian authorities only initiate mandatory halts when there are serious inadequacies.  
In the post 1998 Asian Financial crisis environment, most of these inadequacies have to do with 
financial distress.  The Securities Commission in having initiated a trading halt would require 
the company to come up with a restructuring plan.  The restructuring plan is usually in the form 
of asset sales, debt restructuring,  recapitalization or some combination thereof.  Since, trading 
in the stock will only be allowed to resume when the firm has come-up with a viable plan, 
inability to do so will mean continued suspension followed by possible delisting.  A 
restructuring plan to be acceptable must obviously be one that will subsequently put the firm in 
a better financial position.  Thus, our sample of  28 mandatory halts are by definition those that 
had successfully `restructured’ and were allowed to resume trading.  This survivor bias and the 
uniqueness of  Malaysian regulatory requirement explains the hugely positive CARs post-halt. 
 
4.3: Price Effect by Type of News 
 Figure 2, shows the plot of daily CARs for our sample of voluntary halts7, categorized 
by type of news.  The difference in price reaction is obvious.  The good news category shows 
steady increase in prices all the way to day +60.  The bad news category shows a sharp initial 
decline for about 20 trading days (one month) before stabilizing and reversing course.  The 
neutral news category shows no distinct trend.  The statistical tests in Table 1, confirm this 
price behaviour.  For the good news sample, all 3 post-halt windows have significantly higher 
MCARs.  Most of the positive CARs happen in the first 5 days following announcement.  For 
the neutral news category, though MCARs for 60 days are marginally higher, both the t and 
Wilcoxon tests show price performance in the 5 days following announcement to be no 
                                                 
7 Mandatory halts were not categorized by news, duration or frequency of  halt since these are irrelevant.  
Mandatory halts are by definition ‘bad’ news, are of long duration and are only subjected to a single halt. 
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different from the 5 days immediately prior.  Thus, the price  reaction in the neutral news 
category, is largely muted.  The MCARs for bad news category is already in negative territory 
for the -60 and -30 day windows.  The MCAR however shows a positive build-up just before 
announcement as seen from the -5 days window.  All these positive build-up however is erased 
following announcement.  MCAR is sharply negatively for the +5 and +30 day windows. 
 
 The price reaction seen here is line with expectations.  What is interesting is the build-
up in prices just before announcement.  Though Table 1 shows this to be true for all 3 news 
categories, the build-up is most obvious in Figure 2 for the Good and Neutral news categories.
  
4.4: Price Effect by Duration of Halt 
 We next examined whether the duration of halt matters for price reaction.  The results in 
Table 1 confirmed the relevance.  For short duration halts, MCARs for all 3 windows are 
significantly higher post halt.  We see two obvious differences for Medium term halts.  The 
MCARs, though higher post-halt are all lower relative to the ones we saw for short duration 
halts.  Second, both tests show MCARs to be no different between the -5 and +5 day windows.  
Implying, there is no significant initial price reaction when trading resumes.  In sharp contrast 
to short and medium duration halts, long term halts show very different price behaviour.  
MCARs are already negative for all 3 windows even before the halt.  When trading resumes, 
there is sharp negative reaction initially.  The stocks experience a MCAR of -17% within the 
first week.  This decline however abates with time.  Though the +5 and +30 day windows have 
negative MCARs, it is marginally positive for +60 days.  Interestingly, these results are similar 
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to that of Hopewell & Schwartz (1978 who found price adjustments of greater magnitude for 
halts of longer duration. 
 
 The above results, together with those in Table 2 comparing MCARs across categories 
imply a link between duration of halt and price behaviour post-halt.  Generalizing, it appears 
from our results that shorter duration halts experience positive price reaction post-halt, whereas 
long duration halts experience the opposite.  These results are sensible when we consider the 
fact that all halts are disruptive and longer term ones more so.  Even if the halt was voluntarily 
requested, issuing companies will only want longer halts if they have more complex issues to 
solve.  Complicated problems that require a longer time-out.  The negative MCARs we saw for 
all three pre-halt windows would imply that may indeed be the case.  Companies needing long-
duration halts already experience problems and need the time-out to sort these out. 
 
 Our final analysis with regards to price effect was to see if the frequency of halts had 
any different price behaviour.  The results in Table 1 show similar price reaction post halt.  
When the MCARs are compared between the two categories (Table 2) for matched window 
periods, we see no difference pre-halt but when trading resumes, single halts outperform 
multiple halts.  This out performance is significant at the 5% level by both the parametric and 
non parametric tests. 
 
4.5: Evidence of Information Leakage 
 Scrutinizing the MCARs in table 1 shows an interesting feature.  For almost all 
categories of  analyse, we see a marked increase in MCARs for the -5 day window.  Such a 
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pattern is also clearly visible from the daily CARs plotted in Figures 1 and 2.  This appears to 
be tentative evidence of information leakage.  The presence of such leakage has been 
documented for several markets in the previous studies cited in Section 2.  To seek 
confirmation of such leakage for Bursa Malaysia we examined the MCAR for significant 
difference across two different window periods, 20 days before halt.  The first is the 10 day 
pre-halt window (-20 to -11) and the final 10 days (-10 to -1).  Essentially we want to see if 
there is significant price change in the last 2 weeks leading to the halt relative to the 2 weeks 
prior.  The results are shown in Table 3.  At the 5% level, both the parametric and non-
parametric test show consistent results. 
  
 For the overall sample of 291 companies, MCAR for the last 10 days is indeed 
significantly higher, than the 10 previous days.  This initial evidence of leakage is reinforced 
when we examine the voluntary and mandatory sub-segments.  Voluntary halts have MCARs 
almost 3 time higher in the final 10 days than the previous 10 day window.  Mandatory halts on 
the other hand have MCARs more than 3 times lower in the last 10 days.  The differences are 
statically significant for both cases. 
 
 When the same 10 day windows were examined across the different type of news 
categories, MCARs for the latter window period was significantly higher in all cases-even for 
the bad news category.  What is interesting is that when we go from good to neutral to bad 
news categories, the MCAR reduces steadily.  Finally, both the single and multiple suspension 
categories had significantly higher MCARs for the last 10 day window8. 
                                                 
8 We did not evaluate the duration of halt category since duration of halt cannot be known prior to or even at 
announcement. 
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 Summarizing the results, with the exception of mandatory halts which saw a marked 
price decline immediately prior to announcement,  all voluntary halts, regardless of subcategory 
experience significant price build-up just prior to halt.  So, what do these results tell us? Is this 
simply a case of the market anticipating the halt and acting preemptively or is this evidence of 
trading on privileged inside information?  There are two reasons why we believe it is the latter.  
First, when we consider voluntary halts, even if the market can anticipate the release of good 
news, it is difficult for outsiders to know when a company will ask for voluntary suspension.  
Only those with inside information can tell the timing of a trading halt request.  This can 
explain the very significant build-up in MCARs/prices just  prior to halt announcements that 
are then followed by the release of good news.  Second, going by the same logic, even if a 
firm’s financial distress is known, the timing of a mandatory halt is difficult to gauge for 
outsiders.  Yet,  the fact that MCARs are significantly negatively just before official 
announcement of halt, appears to be the work of those trading on privileged information.  
While we believe our analysis thus far provides sufficient evidence of information leakage, it 
still leaves unexplained the positive price build-up even for the bad news category9. 
 
4.6: Effect on Trading Volume 
 Lee et al (1994), Ferris et al (1992) and Christie et al (2002) have all shown similar 
findings with regards to volume and volatility.  All three studies show higher than normal 
volume and volatility in the pre-suspension period with the trend continuing in the immediate 
post suspension period.  Where volume is concerned, our results appear to be very much line 
with these US based studies.  Figure 3 shows the Mean Daily Volume for our overall sample 
                                                 
9 MCARs for the bad news category is negative for the first 10 day window but turns marginally positive for the 
final 10 days. 
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and voluntary/mandatory categories for the 120 day period surrounding halt announcements.  
There is a clear build-up in daily volume in the period immediately before the halt 
announcement.  The uptrend continues in the period immediately following trading resumption.  
In all three cases, the rise in traded volume is short lived.  It peaks at about 5 days after 
resumption before sliding steadily back to normal levels.  In fact all the action appears 
concentrated between days -20 and +20.  This is identical to Ferris et. al (1992) who report that 
volume levels return to normal 20 days after suspension. 
 
 Results of our statistical tests for volume are shown in Table 4.  For the overall sample,  
mean volumes are higher for all 3 post halt windows, however the significance tests are mixed.  
For the sample of 263 voluntary halts, volume is significantly higher post-halt in the 5 and 60 
day windows.  This is in stark  contrast to the sample of mandatory halts.  Volume, though 
higher for the +5 day window, is lower for both +30 and +60 day windows.  Both the t-test and 
Wilcoxon show significantly lower volume for post 60 days relative to 60 days pre halt.  When 
we examine volume patterns by news category, though all three categories show higher volume 
for the +5 day window, in contrast to good and neutral news, the bad news category shows 
significantly lower volume for the +60 day window. 
 
 When examining volume by duration of halt, short duration halts had no different 
volume in all 3 post halt windows.  Halts of medium duration showed significantly higher 
volume in the +5 and +30 windows.  Both tests confirmed this at the 5% level.  This is 
interesting since it lends support to the argument that halts will lead to pent-up demand and 
therefore longer duration halts should see a bigger build-up in demand.  Indeed this is true 
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when we go from short to medium duration halts.  However, our results for long duration halts 
are not consistent with this argument.  Volume is in fact significantly lower for the +5 and +60 
day windows.  We believe this could be due to the same argument we had made in explaining 
the negative CARs for long duration halts.  That a long duration halt was needed for a stock, 
implies more complicated problems, thus the negative CARs and the significantly lower traded 
volumes. 
 
4.7: Impact on Volatility 
 Our analysis of the impact of halts on returns volatility showed interesting results.  
Recall that we measure volatility as the variance of daily returns.  Table 5 shows the results of 
our F-test and the non parametric Wilcoxon test on the variance of daily returns.  Figures 4 and 
5 show the plot of daily returns over the 120 day period.  Turning to Table 5, variance of 
returns for the overall sample is significantly higher for all 3 post-halt windows.  Post halt 
volatility increase as the window period is lengthened.  This overall picture changes drastically 
when we decompose the sample by category.  There is a marked contrast in the post-halt 
behaviour of returns volatility between mandatory and voluntary halts.  The mandatory sample 
has much higher volatility relative to the voluntary sample even before halts.  This volatility 
increases very substantially after trading resumes for the mandatory sample.  As is obvious 
from the table, post-halt volatility is sharply higher in the +5 day window then abates and is 
marginally lower for the +30 day window.  For the 60 day window post-halt volatility is several 
times higher.  While one would expect higher volatility as sample period is lengthened, the 
increase in variance is very high for the 60 day windows10.  In stark contrast to these results, the 
                                                 
10 This appears to the one instance where the parametric and non-parametric tests produced inconsistent results. 
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sample of voluntary halts showed significantly lower volatility post-halt.  Volatility falls 
substantially in the +5 day window before rising steadily as window period lengthens.  In fact, 
as opposed to the mandatory sample, volatility is several fold lower for the 5 and 30 day 
windows post-halt. 
 
 Figure 4, which shows a scaled plot of daily returns, captures this vast difference in 
volatility behaviour between the two samples11.  When we tried to explore for reasons for the 
very high volatility of the mandatory sample, we came up with 4 possible explanations.  First, 
stocks of companies subjected to mandatory halts being troubled companies to begin with, had 
been severely beaten down from their original IPO and par values.  Only about half over 
sample was selling for above one ringgit, a typical par value.  Many selling below 50 sen, were 
essentially penny stocks.  So, one key reason for the high volatility is the very low traded price.  
Small absolute price prices lead to large variance. Second, mandatory halts experienced much 
longer suspensions.  The average length of trading suspension for our mandatory sample was 
42 days.  Howe & Schlarboum (1986) show longer suspensions to coincide with bigger 
negative residuals. The third contributory reason is probably the low liquidity of these stocks.  
Low liquidity tends to go hand in hand with high volatility.  The fourth and probably most 
important reason for the very high post-halt volatility is information released during 
suspension.  As mentioned earlier, companies subjected to mandatory halts have to come up 
with viable restructuring plans before trading is allowed to be resumed.  We believe, the 
announcement of these plans which are extensive by nature leads to increased uncertainty 
especially when initially implemented.  Thus, the increased post halt volatility.   
 
                                                 
11 Daily returns of the mandatory sample was scaled by 10. 
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 Our results of higher volatility for mandatory halts in the post suspension period is in-
line with findings of Ferris, et al (1992) who examine SEC ordered trading halts.  There is also 
conformity with the results of Wu (1998) who examines mandatory halts in the Hong Kong.  
Further, as reported in Wu (1998), the largest change in value is typically on the 1st day of 
resumption of trading.  This too was consistent in our case.  Price variance on day 1 for our 
mandatory sample was 180%!  In fact price reaction was highest on day 1 for most of our 
categories.  Our findings of significantly lower volatility for voluntary halts are however 
contradictory to Wu (1998) who finds volatility to be higher post suspension, even though they 
were lower than that of the mandatory sample.     
 
 When the voluntary halts were categorized by type of news, the volatility results were 
in line with expectations.  The good news category showed significantly lower volatility for all 
3 windows post-halt.  Neutral news showed similar results.  The bad news category on the other 
hand, had volatility that was no different post/pre halt.  Both tests showed post-halt volatility to 
be no different at the 5% level.  In fact, variance was marginally higher for the 30 and 60 day 
windows post-halt.  Figure 5 plots changes in daily returns by news category.  The bad news 
category obviously has higher fluctuation relative to the other two categories and higher 
volatility post halt relative to its pre-halt volatility.  A result consistent with the findings of Tan 
& Yeo (2003). 
 
 When volatility was examined by duration of halt, both short and medium duration halts 
showed lower post-halt volatility.  For long duration halts, both tests showed no change in 
volatility.  Single/Multiple suspensions both displayed lower volatility post halt. 
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Section 5: Conclusion 
 This paper undertakes a comprehensive evaluation of the efficacy of trading halts in the 
Malaysian context.  At issue are two contending arguments.  The Price Efficiency Hypothesis 
of trading halts which contends that since halts give time for investors to better digest the 
impact of news, volatility should be lower with a higher degree of price efficiency post halt.  
The learning through trading argument would contend otherwise.  Given these contending 
arguments, we examine the effectiveness of trading halts by way of addressing 5 broad research 
questions.  These are  (i) what is the overall impact of trading halts on stock returns, volatility 
and volume?  (ii) How different are these results when the halt is voluntary as opposed to 
mandatory?  (iii) What difference if any, does the type of news released make? (iv)   Does the 
duration of the halt/suspension have any influence? and (v) Are the results of single halts any 
different from those of multiple halts?   
 
 Based on our overall sample, trading halts result in a positive price reaction, increased 
volume and volatility.  There is indeed a significant difference in the results of voluntary as 
opposed to  mandatory halts.  The type of news released during the halt has a huge impact on 
all three variables, price, volume and volatility post-halt.  The duration of halt has isolated 
impact and appears to be largely inconsequential.  The frequency of halts; whether single or 
multiple does not seem to matter. 
 
 Comparing our results with that of previous studies, we find that for all three variables 
examined, price/abnormal returns, volatility and volume, there is broad conformity where our 
overall sample is concerned.  However, when we refined the analysis by examining the sub 
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categories, we found some interesting differences.  The two key differences in our findings 
worth highlighting are (i) the significantly positive CARs post-halt for our sample of 
mandatory halts and (ii) the significantly lower volatility post halt for the voluntary sample.  As 
explained earlier, we attribute the positive price response of mandatory halts to the peculiarity 
of regulatory framework.  In explaining the lower volatility for voluntary halts, aside from the 
fact that our sample of voluntary halts had a preponderance of good and neutral news (240 
companies) and less than 10% bad news (23 companies), we believe there may be more to it.  
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978) find that “price adjustments associated with temporary 
suspensions are consistent with substantial and permanent shifts in equilibrium securities 
prices”.  Our results would lend support to such an argument, particularly the good news 
category (120 companies) within the voluntary sample.  When one considers the fact that the 
sharp steady increase in CARs goes hand in hand with significantly lower volatility, it appears 
that at least this category within the voluntary sample is being repriced.  Given the persistence 
in CARs, falling volatility implies a re rating of the stocks concerned.  That this repricing 
happens only gradually and not immediately following trading resumption may be due to one 
of two factors as Kabir (1994) points out.  From his study of halts on the London Stock 
Exchange which finds significant positive abnormal returns for up to a month following trading 
reinstatement, he argues that the persistence indicates either that the complete impact of new 
information takes place only gradually or that not all relevant information is disclosed during 
the halt. 
 
 With the exception of the above two results, most of our findings were broadly 
consistent and logical.  With regards to the contentious issues still being debated about trading 
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halts, there are a number of conclusions we can draw from our results.  First, trading halts are 
indeed significant events, especially from a returns/price effect viewpoint.  Second, from a 
volume and volatility perspective, the type of halt, whether voluntary or mandatory matters a 
lot.  Third, the type of news released during the halt is the critical determinant of how all three 
variables, price effect, traded volume and volatility would behave post halt.  Fourth, duration of 
halt and frequency; whether single  or multiple, appear to be largely inconsequential.  Fifth, 
while differences in market microstructure do not appear to matter, the regulatory framework 
does.  Finally, one could also conclude that anticipatory behaviour/information leakage appears 
to go hand-in-hand with trading halts. 
 
 So, are trading halts effective in handling information imbalances?  Taking all three 
variables (price reaction, volatility and volume) together, with the exception of mandatory halts 
and the ‘bad news’ category within the voluntary sample,  our results support the price 
efficiency hypothesis of trading halts.  Mandatory halts and the ‘bad news’ category show 
increased volatility and reduced  trading volume, thereby lending support to the learning 
through trading argument.  With the exception of these two subsets  our overall results are 
consistent with the argument that trading halts help disseminate information and enhance the 
price discovery process.  
 29
References: 
Bhattacharya, U. and Spiegel, M. (1998); Anatomy of a Market Failure; NYSE 
Trading Suspensions (1974 – 1988), Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 
April, pp. 216 – 226. 
 
Chen, H., Chen, H. and Valerios, N. (2003); The effects of trading halts on price 
discovery for NYSE stocks, Applied Economics, 35, pp. 91 – 97. 
 
Christie, W.G, Corwin, S.A. & Harris, J.H. (2002); Nasdaq Trading Halts:  The 
Impact of Market Mechanisms on Prices, Trading Activity, and Execution Costs, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. LVII, No. 3, pp 1443 – 1478. 
 
Duque, J. and Fazenda, A. R. (2003); Evaluating market supervision through an 
overview of trading halts in the Portuguese stock market, Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 349 – 376. 
 
Ferris, S.P. Kumar, R. & Wolfe, G.A. (1992);  The Effect of SEC – Ordered 
Suspensions on Returns, Volatility and Trading Volume, The Financial Review, Vol. 
27, No. 1, pp 1 – 34. 
 
Hopewell, M.H. & Schwartz, A.L. (1978); Temporary Trading Suspensions In 
Individual NYSE Securities, The Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXIII, No. 5, pp 1355 – 
1373. 
 
Howe, J. S. and Schlarbaum, G. G. (1986); SEC Trading Suspensions:  Empirical 
Evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 21. No. 3, pp 323 – 
333. 
 
Kabir, r. (1994); Share price behaviour around trading suspensions on the London 
Stock Exchange, Applied Financial Economics, 24, pp. 289 – 295. 
 
Lee, M.C, Ready, M. J & Seguin, P.J. (1994); Volume, Volatility, and New York 
Stock Exchange Trading Halts, The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLIX, No. 1 pp. 183 – 
211. 
 
McDonald, C.G and Michayluk, D. (2003); Suspicious trading halts, Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management, No. 13, pp. 251 – 263. 
 
Tan, S.K. & Yeo, W.Y. (2003); Voluntary Trading Suspension in Singapore, 
Applied Financial Economics, (13); pp 517 – 523. 
 
Wu, L (1998); market Reactions to the Hong Kong Trading Suspensions:  
Mandatory versus Voluntary, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, (25) (3) & 
(4), pp 419 – 437. 
 30
Table 1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Category 
 
Price Effect By News By Duration Frequency Window 
Period Overall Voluntary Mandatory Good Neutral Bad Short Med Long Single Multiple 
(-60 to -1)            1.0770 .9846 1.9456 2.3463 2.6350 -1.12029 2.0517 .3981 -12.4045 .9547 1.1184
(+1 to +60) 8.8800 8.0651 16.5343 14.8738 2.7264 .4066 10.5503 4.2919 2.3364 11.4132 7.2065 
(-30 to -1)            2.0115 1.9196 2.8749 3.7162 .6580 -.8714 3.6891 .5252 -15.7090 1.7727 2.2686
(+1 to +30) 7.3775 6.815 12.6598 12.8591 2.7632 -3.5775 9.3678 3.6907 -6.6638 10.5240 5.4042 
(-5 to -1)            4.8120 5.143 1.6954 6.1787 4.8091 1.4904 7.6503 2.771 -15.4385 5.7903 4.5031
(+1 to +5) 6.7212 6.253 11.112 10.4326 3.5251 -1.3127 9.1165 3.6264 -17.3855 9.3882 5.7221 
 
-62.680 
(000) 
 
 
-50.949 
(.000) 
 
 
-16.762 
(.000) 
 
 
-81.080 
(.000) 
 
 
-9.231 
(.000) 
 
 
-2.544 
(.014) 
 
 
-43.114 
(.000) 
 
 
-13.947 
(.000) 
 
 
-7.275 
(.000) 
 
 
-50.665 
(.000) 
 
 
-42.387 
(.000) 
 
-25.200 
(000) 
 
-18.766 
(.000) 
 
-15.507 
(.000) 
 
-54.777 
(.000) 
 
-4.294 
(.000) 
 
4.708 
(.000) 
 
-16.533 
(.000) 
 
-7.130 
(.000) 
 
-5.405 
(.000) 
 
-25.960 
(.000) 
 
-10.523 
(.000) 
 
T-Stat 
-4.187 
(014) 
-2.656 
(.057) 
-7.737 
(.002) 
-8.516 
(.001) 
2.626 
(.058) 
6.647 
(.003) 
-4.111 
(.015) 
-1.256 
(.277) 
.667 
(.553) 
-6.308 
(.003) 
-4.940 
(.008) 
 
-6.736  
(.000) 
 
 
-6.736  
(.000) 
 
 
-6.736 
(.000) 
 
 
-6.736 
(.000) 
 
 
-5.904 
(.000) 
 
 
-2.245 
(.025) 
 
 
-6.736 
(.000) 
 
 
-6.729 
(.000) 
 
 
-5.382 
(.000) 
 
 
-6.736 
(.000) 
 
 
-6.736 
(.000) 
 
-4.782 
 (.000) 
 
-4.782  
(.000) 
 
-4.782 
(.000) 
 
-4.782 
(.000) 
 
-3.466 
(.001) 
 
-3.651 
(.000) 
 
-4.782 
(.000) 
 
-4.391 
(.000) 
 
-4.184 
(.000) 
 
-4.782 
(.000) 
 
-4.782 
(.000) 
 
Wilcoxon 
Z-Stat 
-2.023 
(.043) 
-1.753 
 (.080) 
-2.023 
(.043) 
-2.023 
(.043) 
-1.753 
(.080) 
-2.023 
(.043) 
-2.023 
(.043) 
-1.214 
(.225) 
-.730 
(.465) 
-2.023 
(.043) 
-2.023 
(.043) 
 
The table shows the Mean CARs by window period for the different categories.  T-stat values shown are for paired sample test the prob. values are shown below 
in brackets. 
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Table 2 
Cross Comparison across Sample by Window Period 
 
Category 
By Type of Halt  
Voluntary Vs. Mandatory 
Mean T-Stat Wilcoxon Z-Stat 
(-60 to -1) -.9610 -2.790 (007) -2.665 (.008) 
(-1 to -30) -.95533 -1.624 (.115) -1.697 (.090) 
(-1 to -5) 3.4483 12.128 (.000) -2.023 (.043) 
(1 +60) -8.4692 -12.638 (.000) -6.729 (.000) 
(1 + 30) -5.8446 -19.558 (.000) -4.782 (.000) 
(1 to 5) -4.8587 -5.427 (.006) -2.023 (.043) 
 By News Category  
Good News vs. Bad News 
 
(-60 to -1) 3.4666 15.110 (.000) -6.736 (.000) 
(-1 to -30) 4.5877 15.158  (.000) -4.782 (.000) 
(-1 to -5) 4.6882 9.025 (.001) -2.023 (.043) 
(1 +60) 14.4671 29.252 (.000) -6.736 (.000) 
(1 + 30) 16.4367 35.555 (.000) -4.782 (.000) 
(1 to 5) 11.7453 23.296 (.000) -2.023 (.043) 
By Frequency of Halt 
Single vs Multiple 
   
(-60 to -1) -.1636 -.997 (.323) -1.097 (.273) 
(-1 to -30) -.4958 -1.826 (.078) -2.005 (.045) 
(-1 to -5) 1.2871 1.917 (.128) -2.023 (.043) 
(1 +60) 4.2067 18.022 (.000) -6.736 (.000) 
(1 + 30) 5.1198 19.793 (.000) -4.782 (.000) 
(1 to 5) 3.6661 9.908 (.001) -2.023 (.043) 
By Duration of Halt 
Short vs Long 
   
(+1 to +60) 8.6287 6.352 (.000) -5.212 (.000) 
(+1 to +30) 16.5613 10.575 (.000) -4.782 (.000) 
(+1 to +5) 27.5355 11.484 (.000) -2.023 (.043) 
  
 The table shows the Mean CARs by window period for the different categories.  T-stat values shown are for 
 paired sample test the prob. values are shown below in brackets. 
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Table 3 
Test for Evidence of Information Leakage 
 
By Category of Halt 
Overall – Voluntary & Mandatory Mean T-Stat Wilcoxon Z-Stat 
(-20 to -11) 
 
1.6824 
 
 
-6.333 
(.000) 
 
-2.803 
(.005) 
(-10 to -1) 3.8032   
Voluntary –Suspension    
(-20 to -11) 1.4912 
 
-8.446 
(.000) 
 
-2.803 
(.005) 
(-10 to -1) 4.0933   
Mandatory    
(-20 to -11) 3.477 
 
3.565 
(.006) 
 
-2.497 
(.013) 
(-10 to -1) 1.0783   
Voluntary By News Category 
Good News 
 
(-20 to -11) 3.748 
 
-4.179 
(.002) 
 
-2.803 
(.005) 
(-10 to -1) 5.259   
Neutral    
(-20 to -11) -.3488 
 
-7.527 
(.000) 
 
-2.803 
(.005) 
(-10 to -1) 3.410   
Bad    
(-20 to -11) 
 
-.6825 
 
-3.184 
(-.011) 
 
-2.599 
(.009) 
 
(-10 to -1) 
 
1.574  
 
 
By Frequency of Halt    
Multiple    
(-20 to -11) 2.6763 
 
-4.802 
(.001) 
 
-2.803 
(.005) 
(-10 to -1) 
 3.6217   
Single    
(-20 to -11) .7280 
 
-8.891 
(.000) 
 
-2.803 
(.005) 
(-10 to -1) 
 
4.636   
 The table shows the Mean CARs by window period for the different categories.  T-stat values shown are for 
 paired sample test the prob. values are shown below in brackets. 
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Table 4 
Mean Daily Volume 
 
Price Effect By News By Duration Frequency Window 
Period Overall Voluntary Mandatory Good Neutral Bad Short Med Long Single Multiple 
(-60 to -1) 1286655.67           1356603.54 629645.35 822111.63 941522.34 1088635.79 854786.59 1023620.43 254520.92 689692.78 1187643.23
(+1 to +60) 2185269.80           2362928.92 516543.12 1997982.33 994148.79 770226.68 1644844.24 1141272.14 328407.22 774849.27 2399114.35
(-30 to -1) 1364379.15           1439878.43 655225.23 955564.17 900850.98 1082193.33 935325.93 985441.69 294677.40 684730.43 1289971.62
(+1 to +30) 2807778.98           3048612.53 545663.86 2685852.84 1115735.89 903458.55 2160076.39 1326152.05 273102.69 900419.21 3162613.77
(-5 to -1) 1492847.28           1557766.61 883069.28 953688.30 1236462.93 1250656.52 1038663.19 1292162.81 350597.77 1005471.20 1244040.27
(+1 to +5) 2141049.20           2232657.49 1280585.71 1376211.82 1770799.50 1219892.17 1376092.77 1966888.47 150451.11 1395489.80 1738650.14
T-Stat 
 
-2.190 
 (.032) 
 
-1.830 
 (.078) 
 
-3.741  
(.020) 
 
-2.216  
(.031) 
 
-1.843  
(.076) 
 
-4.142  
(.014) 
 
3.397  
(.001) 
 
1.218  
(.233) 
 
-1.388  
(.238) 
 
-1.609  
(.113) 
 
-1.257 
 (.219) 
 
-3.440 
(.026) 
 
-.939  
(.351) 
 
-3.202  
(.003) 
 
-3.587  
(.023) 
 
4.355 
(.000) 
 
1.758 
(.089) 
 
153 
(.886) 
 
-1.468 
(.147) 
 
-1.203 
(.239) 
 
-1.823 
(.142) 
 
-1.938 
(.057) 
 
-4.383 
(.000) 
 
-5.730 
(.005) 
 
-3.102 
(.003) 
 
.637 
(.529) 
 
3.392 
(.027) 
 
-1.955 
(.055) 
 
-3.222 
(.003) 
 
-5.284 
(.006) 
 
-1.453 
(.151) 
 
-1.185 
(.246) 
 
-2.063 
(.108) 
Wilcoxon 
Z-Stat 
 
-1.708  
(.088) 
 
-2.396 
 (.017) 
 
-2.023  
(.043) 
 
-1.855 
 (.064) 
 
-2.581  
(.010) 
 
-2.023  
(.043) 
 
-3.401 
(.001) 
 
-2.252 
(.024) 
 
-1.214 
(.225) 
 
-4.667 
(.000) 
 
-3.116 
(.002) 
 
-2.023 
(.043) 
 
-.199 
(.842) 
 
-2.684 
(.007) 
 
-2.023 
(.043) 
 
-4.086 
(.000) 
 
-1.944 
(.052) 
 
-.135 
(.813) 
 
-1.701 
(.089) 
 
-2.417 
(.016) 
 
-1.214 
(.225) 
 
-1.362 
(.173) 
 
-3.363 
(.001) 
 
-2.023 
(.043) 
 
-2.739 
(.006) 
 
-.812 
(.417) 
 
-.2.023 
(.043) 
 
-2.010 
(.044) 
 
-2.787 
(.005) 
 
-2.023 
(.043) 
 
-1.494 
(.135) 
 
-2.910 
(.004) 
 
-1.753 
(.080) 
 
The table shows Mean Daily Volume by window period for the different categories.  T-stat values shown are for paired sample test the prob. values are shown 
below in brackets. 
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Table 5 
Volatility of Daily Returns 
 
Price Effect By News By Duration Frequency Window 
Period Overall Voluntary Mandatory Good Neutral Bad Short Med Long Single Multiple 
(-60 to -1) 2.554705           0.001254 26.5389 0.001138 0.001404 0.001767 0.00138 0.000976 0.001824 0.001354135 0.001106
(+1 to +60) 88.40587           0.001234 918.7779 0.000976 0.000917 0.001782 0.00102 0.000876 0.001212 0.001099934 0.000793
(-30 to -1) 3.472286           0.001357 36.07422 0.001295 0.00135 0.001897 0.00143 0.00106 0.003081 0.001350367 0.001368
(+1 to +30) 3.142628           0.000842 32.65298 0.000758 0.000844 0.001957 0.000958 0.000693 0.000256 0.00096044 0.000665
(-5 to -1) 4.707086           0.00212 48.90016 0.001632 0.002854 0.001365 0.002922 0.000976 0.000256 0.001648783 0.002818
(+1 to +5) 7.420658           0.00049 77.11724 0.000463 0.000455 0.000797 0.00052 0.000462 0.000243 0.000502735 0.000471
F-Stat 
9.08E-05 
(0) 
 
1.225924 
(0.041689) 
 
0.34929 
(0) 
0.23357 
(0) 
 
2.938413 
(8.18E-18) 
 
169.7847 
(3E-216) 
6.34E-05 
(0) 
 
1.227714 
(0.298876) 
 
0.345276 
(0.003712) 
1.440614 
(0.023763) 
 
2.258433 
(6.07E-06) 
 
36.14764 
(1.96E-60) 
2.844534 
(1.29E-08) 
 
3.175171 
(4.51E-10) 
 
477.5973 
(7.5E-126) 
0.62466 
(0.138705) 
 
0.69845 
(0.203276) 
 
2.03542 
(0.051991) 
 
1.713403 
(0.000349  ) 
 
1.938854 
(1.61E-05) 
 
217.5889 
(2.9E-142) 
 
 
2.628701 
(3.2E-06) 
 
11.01392 
(1.77E-25) 
 
5.811334 
(1.29E-15) 
1.849358 
(0.201425) 
 
1235.891 
(1.49E-11) 
 
0.92031 
(0.454689) 
1.941295716 
(2.07403E05) 
 
1.82645162 
(9.64929E-05) 
 
35.83203279 
(2.45595E-78) 
1.683927 
(0.004039) 
 
5.679062 
(2.25E-17) 
 
377.5843 
(6.1E-106) 
Wilcoxon 
Z-Stat 
 
-1.558 
(.119) 
 
-3.650 
(.000) 
 
-5.200 
(.000) 
 
-2.307 
(.021) 
 
-3380 
(.001) 
 
-5.518 
(.000) 
 
-1.070 
(.285) 
 
-1.298 
(1.94) 
 
-.319 
(.750) 
 
-1.563 
(.118) 
 
-2.208 
(.027) 
 
-3.418 
(.001) 
 
-2.092 
(.036) 
 
-2.092 
(.036) 
 
-4.254 
(.000) 
 
-.274 
(.784) 
 
-.791 
(.429) 
 
-1.460 
(.144) 
 
-3.262 
(.001) 
 
-3.173 
(.002) 
 
-4.264 
(.000) 
 
-.343 
(.732) 
 
-.857 
(.392) 
 
-3.345 
(.001) 
 
-.296 
(.767) 
 
-2.073 
(.038) 
 
-1.007 
(.314) 
 
-1.049 
(.294) 
 
-2.102 
(.036) 
 
-4.501 
(.000) 
 
-2.463 
(.014) 
 
-2.703 
(.007) 
 
-3.166 
(.002) 
 
The tables shows average volatility of daily return by window period for the different categories.  T-stat values shown are for paired sample test the prob. values 
are shown below in brackets. 
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Table 6 
Breakdown of Voluntary Halts Sample by Category 
 
 
Type of news released Duration of halt Frequency of halt 
● Good news 120 ● Short 162 ● Single 106 
● Neutral news 120 ● Medium 92 ● Multiple 157 
● Bad news 23 ● Long 9   
Total 263 Total 263 Total 263 
 
Note: The total number of Voluntary halts in our sample was 263.  The Mandatory halts which 
had a sample size of 28 firms was not subdivided by category since these are irrelevant.  
Mandatorily ordered halts are by definition ‘bad’ news, are of long duration and are only 
subjected to a single halt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:
Daily CARs for Overall Sample;Voluntary and Mandatory Halts
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Figure 2
Daily CARs by Type of News
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Figure 3:
Mean Daily Volume for Overall,Voluntary and Mandatory Halts
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Figure 4:
Volatility of Daily Returns(Scaled),Voluntary vs Mandatory
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Figure 5:
Volatility of Daily Returns by Type of News
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